

Honorable Errett P. Scrivner
House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

DOCUMENT
NO. 1
DATE 26/2/81
REVIEWED

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Dear Mr. Scrivner:

Following up on your recent telephone call, I find that the January 1958 issue of the Soviet magazine USSR was received in the Central Intelligence Agency library on 20 January 1958. This issue features an article on Sputnik II, illustrated with photographs and diagrams, and giving a general description of the artificial satellite and its instrumentation.

All of this material, including the photographs, was published in the Soviet newspapers PRAVDA and IZVESTIA on 13 and 14 November 1957 and were reprinted the next day in U. S. newspapers. Several U. S. magazines have printed feature articles based on the photographs. Much of the text of the USSR article had been broadcast by Radio Moscow on 3 and 4 November 1957.

This material has been in the possession of this Agency since its publication in the Soviet Union and has been carefully studied by our technical analysts. The photographs indicate that the instrumentation was designed primarily for reliability. Its arrangement is simple and no special refinements are evident in its installation. The various instruments appear to be bulky and no effort was made to reduce their weight.

The other articles discussing science and research in the Soviet Union that are printed in this issue of USSR also were published earlier by the Soviet press and radio and have been analyzed by this organization.

I appreciate very much your calling this item to our attention and I trust the above answers any questions you may have had about the matter.

Sincerely,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

OGC/LC:JSW:mks (22 January 1958)

Distribution:

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
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2 - Legislative Counsel

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24 JAN 1958



cc: [unclear]
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House of Representatives
Washington 25, D. C.

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Distribution:

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✓ 1 - ER

2 - Legislative Counsel

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

21 JAN 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sputnik II Pictures in Soviet Magazine "USSR"

1. This memorandum is for information only.
2. The January 1958 issue of the Soviet magazine "USSR" was received in the CIA library on 20 January 1958. This issue features an article on Sputnik II, illustrated with photographs and diagrams, and giving a general description of the artificial satellite and its instrumentation.
3. All of this material, including the photographs, was published in the Soviet newspapers "Pravda" and "Izvestia" on 13 and 14 November 1957 and were reprinted the next day in US newspapers. Several US magazines have printed feature articles based on the photographs. Much of the text of the "USSR" article had been broadcast by Radio Moscow on 3 and 4 November 1957.
4. This material has been in the possession of CIA since its publication in the Soviet Union and has been carefully studied by our technical analysts. The photographs indicate that the instrumentation was designed primarily for reliability. Its arrangement is simple and no special refinements are evident in its installation. The various instruments appear to be bulky and no effort was made to reduce their weight.
5. The other articles discussing science and research in the Soviet Union that are printed in this issue of "USSR" also were published earlier by the Soviet press and radio and have been analysed by this organization.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence

STAT

cc: DDCI
DD/I
Legislative Counsel

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(SENDER WILL CIRCLE CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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☐ APPROVAL ☐ INFORMATION ☐ SIGNATURE
☐ ACTION ☐ DIRECT REPLY ☐ RETURN
☐ COMMENT ☐ PREPARATION OF REPLY ☐ DISPATCH
☐ CONCURRENCE ☐ RECOMMENDATION ☐ FILE

Remarks: Attached is a proposed letter for the DCI to sign to Scrivner on the magazine USSR. Most of this is a direct lift from Pete Scoville's memo. *Attached.*

gry

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UNCLASSIFIED		CONFIDENTIAL		SECRET	
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
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Remarks:

EXPEDITE

re: Scrivener's Call. raf

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

STAT	FROM: NAME.	NO.	DATE
	AD/SI	21	JAN 1958

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 24,

Excerpts From Speech by Fulbright

Special to The New York Times.
WASHINGTON, Jan. 23.—Following are excerpts from the speech delivered in the Senate today by Senator J. William Fulbright, Democrat of Arkansas.

From what Administration sources have already put out about the details of their space-age program, it is at bottom, a program calling for a minimal instead of a maximum effort on the part of the United States. For the ruling principle to which it is tailored—as Administration sources have made clear in conference with Congressional leaders—is this: that the Soviet Union—our challenger—is a warped society, wracked by internal strains, and fated for an early and inglorious collapse. In the circumstances, all we have to do is the very little that is required to keep our own motors idling until the inevitable crack-up occurs to the Soviet Union.

It is worth remembering that the doctrinal line here was laid down by the Administration less than two years ago. Shortly after the twentieth Soviet Congress, 1956, we were told by Secretary Dulles that the Russian system was a failure; that they were re-examining their creed from A to Z; that the Soviet Union was making no progress in penetrating the Middle East; and that all in all, their policies had miscarried. Since this was said, any fact, however random, has been seized by Administration sources and woven into the design if it can be made to fit the doctrinal theory of Soviet weakness.

Thus we are told that so much of the Soviet effort has gone into heavy industry and so little into consumer goods, that its economy is out of balance, that its people are dissatisfied and will become dissatisfied. After all, they have only 100,000 automobiles a year, compared to our 6,000,000!

It is suggested, furthermore, that Russian intellectuals cannot be regimented and controlled for ever; that their demands for freedom may cause the Government to turn its attention to some solution of Russia's internal troubles, thereby halting the push toward external aggression and subversion. Additionally, it is suggested that the proof of internal political tension and instability is to be found in the dismissal of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Zhukov. Each of these men represent sources of power that Khrushchev has alienated—so the argument goes—with the result that they are now merely hiding their time for disruptive counter-attack on his present rule.

I would admit straight off that the Soviet system may, in fact, have to be altered. In the long run, it may even collapse. But, as the saying goes, in the long run too, all of us shall be dead! Anyway, what counts most of all in the life of nations is the pace and timing of events. And right now, when the world all around us is being hammered into new shapes, nothing on the line of vision points to a collapse of the Soviet system. True, the Soviet ideology has been, can be, and may be further repudiated by events. But the Soviet power system, something else, within and external to Russia, that power system may continue to justify its efforts in many ideological terms. In point of fact, however, it does not need an ideology to sustain itself. As a power system pure and simple, it has powerful and measurable resources at its disposal.

Vast Natural Resources.
For one thing, the Soviet Union itself represents a land mass three times as large as the United States, with enormous natural resources of every kind, and with a population of more than 200,000,000 inhabitants. Moreover, in recent decades, its natural resources have been increasingly exploited at a rapid pace; and its industry—especially its heavy industry—has been developed enormously. If there are signs of strain here, we would be closer to the truth of the matter in viewing them as the strains of growth instead of decline.

Secondly, it is true enough to say that the people of the Soviet Union lack consumer goods: automobiles, refrigerators, television, and so on. But it does not follow from this, that they are without enough to eat, or that they are lacking in warm clothes and shelter. What actually has happened is that the Soviets have devoted the materials and efforts which might have made automobiles and other luxuries to the development of rockets, satellites, jet planes, basic research, and education.

And, as it happens, the lat-

The New York Times
J. William Fulbright, who spoke yesterday in Senate.

ter activities have a far greater meaning in terms of national strength, than does the availability of luxurious consumer goods. Certainly the Persis of Perses was far more splendid in ornamentation than Sparta and Athens. But who won the battle of Marathon?

As for the dismissal of four of the most important party officials in the Soviet Union: On what grounds can this be construed as a sign of an imminent collapse? The fact that the deadly contest for top-most control over the intricate Soviet apparatus was waged at this time with little violence, and apparently no bloodshed, points more to the self-confidence and strength of the regime than to its weakness.

Again, relatively bleak internal conditions of Russia may, in fact, have the effect of inducing the people of the Soviet Union to work all the harder. In the case of the young, especially, it may induce them to exert every effort to achieve an excellent education—this, because they know that if they remain uneducated, they are doomed to live at a bare subsistence level.

It is, in fact, precisely in the field of education and basic research that the Russians have apparently made their greatest progress. Why should this be so? How is it that they "recognized some years ago that trained minds were indispensable to modern technology, modern weapons, and modern methods of subversion? How is it that they had the vision to upgrade the pay and status of educators and scientists to a level just below that of the ruling hierarchy itself?

It may be that the scholar in the midst of his research is restrained by Communist dogma. But it seems fair to say that the Communists have had the good sense to give way whenever there is conflict between their doctrines and the physical sciences. Witness the results they have achieved. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the scientists and engineers are unhappy with their lot in the Soviet Union. Very few, if any, of them are found among the refugees who seek asylum in the West.

Importance of Education.

So once again the question intrudes itself: Why is it that Soviet leaders, for all their roughness and brutality, have had the shrewdness to recognize the supreme importance of education? Why is it that a system of government which we are told has many inherent weaknesses and is threatened by present internal stresses and strains, has had the foresight to take the long view and to devote a major effort to education?

The determined and successful drive by the Russians to cultivate to the utmost the intellectual powers of their people is the most obvious, the most difficult challenge of all to meet. It will require a leadership of the highest order, with vision and persistence over the long term. Our people, and our political leaders, react promptly and decisively to a challenge requiring a short-term, tangible solution, such as more missiles, or submarines. They have been somewhat less successful in pursuing long-term policies, thoughtful and discriminating in concept, and intangible in character.

The question intrudes itself, and we can answer, in part, that the Soviets inherited from the old Czarist Government a tradition of intellectual excellence and scientific curiosity going back to Peter the Great and the

founding of the Academy of Sciences at a time when America was still a wilderness inhabited by savages. Yet the greater part of the answer, so it seems to me, lies elsewhere.

It lies in the fact that the principal rulers of Russia are professionals who have spent their entire lives in governmental affairs. Their past and their future, their personal fortunes as well as their political positions, are identified with the strength and success of the Government of Soviet Russia. The facts here are documented by Mikhail Dujins, (a former Communist party leader in Yugoslavia), who, in his recent book, "The New Class," emphasizes the proprietary nature of the relationship of the Communist party with all the resources of Russia.

To repeat, the members of the party, and especially the leaders of the party and the rulers of Russia, own the place. None of them regard their adjourn in Moscow as a long stay. They have no comfortable corporate berths to which to retire. They are interested in strengthening the power and endurance of their government because it is the same as strengthening their own power.

In other words, there is an identity of interest between the government, as such, and those who control and operate it. And as they have every reason to take the long view in matters of national policy, they have every reason to encourage Russian scientific and technological developments—since it will be the New Class itself which will get the first benefit from what that science and technology produce.

On the grounds just set forth, then, it does not seem that we ought to count on any easy salvation such as might be brought by Russian internal developments. If we are to survive as a nation and as a democratic society—and if the West is to survive with us—it will be through what we do, and therefore force the Russians to do, and not through what the Russians on their own do or fail to do.

Where, then, do we now stand?

The Real Challenge

Right now, even in the hour of our so-called awakening to danger, the evidence offered by the Administration that it is alive to the most difficult of all the challenges we face is discouraging in the extreme. There is little doubt that we will meet the immediate problem of missiles and satellites. But the real challenge we face, involves the very roots of our society. It involves our educational system, the source of our knowledge and cultural values. And here, the Administration's program for a renaissance of learning is disappointingly small-minded.

There will be those among us who will say—"but education takes too long, and we do not have the time; our efforts must be devoted to missiles and outer space." This is truly the counsel of despair and disaster. The start toward improvement—in education—must be now; it should have been yesterday.

Our most pressing short-range objective should be to start now on our long-range programs. The Administration's proposal of a scholarship and counseling program of \$250,000,000 a year for four years is a step in the right direction. To that proposal there should be added an additional authorization for \$200,000,000 a year to be distributed in accordance with the formula of Senate Bill 472, approved by the Senate by a vote of 58 to 22 in 1948. This would make a respectable start toward our goal.

Not only should we provide more money for education as a whole but we should also reform our basic ideas about elementary and secondary education. We must emphasize the rigorous training of the intellect rather than the gentle cultivation of the personality which has been so popular in recent years.

If we are to play the role of a leader among nations, in truth if we are to retain our independence, we must have men and women who can read, write and speak effectively and who understand thoroughly the world in which we live. Courses in life adjustment and co-ed-cooking will not do the job. Mathematics, languages, the natural sciences and history must once again become the core of the curriculum, and a way must be found to induce the students to study, preferably by inducing a desire to learn. Intellectual discipline is essential to our purposes.

Cong.

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